I. INTRODUCTION
EBMUD is a public utility formed under the California's Municipal Utility District (MUD) Act that supplies water and provides wastewater treatment to parts of Alameda and Contra Costa counties in the east of San Francisco Bay Area. Its highquality water supply system covers 332 square miles and serves 1.4 million customers. Its award-winning wastewater treatment system covers 88 square miles along the San Francisco Bay's eastern shore, protecting the San Francisco Bay, and serves 650,000 customers.
EBMUD owns, maintains, and operates facilities capable of potentially releasing hazardous arc flash energy. As a water and wastewater utility company, EBMUD has to comply with federal, state, and local workplace health and safety regulations to protect its employees and the public. The 2004 California Electrical Code (CEC), which is based on the 2002 National Electrical Code (NEC) [3] , requires that electrical equipment shall be labeled for arc flash protection. EBMUD has complied with this regulation and performed incident energy analyses to identify proper levels of personal protective equipment (PPE) for its employees. EBMUD uses power system analysis software to create a detailed electrical model. The software is used to determine incident energy at various water and wastewater facilities where electrical equipment is installed. It is also used as an engineering tool for determining mitigations at these facilities
II. BACKGROUND

A. Water Facilities
EBMUD's source of water is the Mokelumne River Watershed in the Sierra Nevada Foothills located upstream of Pardee Reservoir near Jackson, California. The water is transported from this 70 billion-gallon reservoir in a system of three closed aqueducts (the Mokelumne Aqueducts). The aqueducts travel 94 miles across the Central Valley and the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta to the EBMUD's service area. The water system includes a network of reservoirs, aqueducts, treatment plants, pumping plants, and distribution facilities stretching from the Sierra foothills to the east of San Francisco Bay Area. The distribution system includes 155 pumping plants, 170 reservoirs in 122 pressure zones ranging in elevation from sea level to 1,450 feet, and 4,000 miles of water mains. About 40 percent of drinking water is supplied and distributed by pumping water operations [4].
On June 16, 2004 , engineering support was requested by the EBMUD's operations staff to assess the arc flash hazard for the high-voltage switchgears and motor control centers at the three raw water (supply) pumping plants facilities prior to the 2004 summer operations. This was requested to comply with the CEC-2004 changes on labeling electrical equipment for arc flash hazard. The three supply pumping plants -namely Walnut Creek, Briones, and Moraga are the largest pumping plants at EBMUD. Walnut Creek Pumping Plants (WCPP) 1, 2, and 3 receives utility power at 115 kV and steps down the voltage to 4,160 volts to distribute power to three 2,000-hp, three 2,500-hp, and four 3,500-hp synchronous pump motors, respectively. Briones Pumping Plant receives utility power at 12 kV and steps down the plant utilization voltage to 4,160 volts for four 800-hp induction vertical pump motors. Moraga Pumping Plant motors are rated at 4,160 volts and consist of one 700-hp, one 1,250-hp, and two 2,000-hp synchronous pump motors. 
B. Wastewater Facilities
The Main Wastewater Treatment Plant (MWWTP) collects sewage from homes and businesses in the surrounding communities through the network of city-owned pipes that empty into the collection system where sewage is treated. The MWWTP is also a green factory. Biodegradable wastes in sewage, food scraps and grease from local restaurants, and waste streams from wineries and poultry farms are trucked in, and are mixed together in large tanks and "digested" by microorganisms. The biogas emitted by the microorganisms is captured and used to generate renewable energy to power the MWWTP and exported to the grid.
The MWWTP has two 12kV feeds (redundant) services from the local utility company. The MWWTP major equipment consists of two 12MVA transformers, two 12kV switchgears, three 2.15 MW power generator units (engine-driven generator), one 4.6 MW power generator (gas-fired turbine generator); including for the future, one 5 MW power generator unit, one 600 hp compressor, four 1,250 hp compressors, four 1,000 hp effluent pump motors, six 700 hp Influent pump motors, and more than sixty six 480V motor control centers.
Methane (digester gas) collected from the digesters is used to fuel combustion units (i.e., engines, turbine, and boiler) to generate electricity and heat at the Power Generation Station (PGS). PGS1 building consists of three engine-driven generators. PGS2 building consists of a one gas-fired turbine generator. Total on-site generation capacity is approximately 11 MW. Generated electricity is used to meet on-site demand and surplus is exported to the grid.
The majority of equipment at the MWWTP has incident energy values requiring PPE for category 2 and below.
480V switchgears and motor control centers immediately downstream from transformers generally have the highest incident energy values. This is because a fault on the line side of the 480V main breaker must be cleared by 4,160V fuses on the transformer primary.
The worst conditions occur on low voltage bus for line side faults and where the main breakers are large with short-time delay, I 2 t function turned on, and high instantaneous settings.
III. HISTORY OF ARC FLASH INCIDENTS
To date, the Water Department has recorded eight arc flash incidents starting in 2004. The majority of these incidents happened during construction, occurring while operating backhoes and cranes. The most expensive ($4M) and catastrophic incident happened at the Walnut Creek Pumping Plant due to human error and equipment failure.
On February 7, 2011, early in the construction of Specification 2008, an explosion occurred at the Walnut Creek Pumping Plants substation due to reclosing a circuit breaker into a 4,160V cable fault. The explosion destroyed the substation's 4,160V switchgear, which was scheduled for replacement, and caused extensive damage to underground cables, the substation transformer bank, and other electrical distribution equipment. The key failure modes which led to the catastrophic explosions of the substation were already wellknown, had been identified as early as 2004 and 2005 when the initial arc flash risk assessment was performed, and were clearly identified in the March 2007 maintenance test program memorandum and follow-up discussions with EBMUD operations staff. A Case History paper was presented at the 2014 IEEE IAS Electrical Safety Workshop for this incident. The paper was later published in the May/June 2015 of the IEEE Industry Applications Magazine as "Rebuilding after a Disaster -Turning a Bad Situation into an Opportunity to Make Electrical Safety Improvements" [16] .
The Wastewater Department recorded two arc flash events since 2001. On February 15, 2005, a reactor (used to limit surge current) on the line side (4,160V) of a substation transformer caused arcing and created a line-to-ground fault due to moisture trapped inside the winding/insulation and trapped dirt built up inside the coils of the reactor.
The reactor was not in use for two years month when it was energized, a local power m several disturbances including current and Within a month the reactor finally "blew" a damaged. The breaker on the line side of th open and caused a power outage to severa MWWTP.
The outage also caused thr generators connected to the same bus to reactor caused a line-to-ground fault and re flash event. The result of the investigatio moisture, dust, and dirt were built up and tr winding/insulation during the two years energized. When energized, arcing occurred.
Fortunately, the substation was built with While the damaged feed was down for repa feed was used. The result of this event req install a new reactor, retest all the as transformer oil, PTs, and CTs. There wer personnel.
IV. ELECTRICAL HAZARD PREVENTIO
A. Objective
The program objective is to perform a assessment of electrical equipment for wastewater facilities to comply with the Ca Code on labeling electrical equipment for arc f
The overall objective of the program is to ha categories of 2 and under, or provide mitig reduce the arc flash risks to achieve this ob PPE Category 2 requires a long sleeve shirt, rated face shield, and other protective equipm daily work wear for EBMUD electricians.
B. Financial and Resources Impact
To perform an arc flash risk assessme purchased power systems analysis s approximately $40,000. Labor costs involv working 20% of their time and five electrician their time.
The time duration to complete an arc flash report is six to ten days and approximately $ Department facility. EBMUD is averaging 28 and spending approximately $250,000 pe EBMUD has spent $1.3M evaluating arc f issuing equipment labels for the Water Depart
The Wastewater Department is smaller Department resulting in a smaller budget fo program. Wastewater Department is averagi $20,000 per facility and $50,000 per year. T budget is $500,000. The cost of performing analysis per facility is more for the Wastew because a typical wastewater facility is mu water pumping plant. 
C. Evaluation Steps and Process
The arc flash risk assessment eva are as follows:
1. Request information from th distribution system impedan characteristics that include v sequence impedances, 3-ph symmetric short circuit duty, existing distribution transform take up to 6 months for a res date.
2. Obtain data and electrical su electricians at each facility. T this work is one day. 
D. NFPA 70E-2015 Recommendations
Here is a quick review of a few recommendations in the NFPA 70E-2015 edition that EBMUD focuses on in the arc flash program. Table  130 .7(C)(15)(A)(a) . It is never assumed that the equipment is properly installed and maintained; EBMUD personnel will always wear the proper PPE when performing any of the activities listed in the table.
3. An arc flash risk assessment shall be performed and shall be updated when major modification or renovation takes place at an EBMUD facility. It shall be reviewed periodically at intervals not to exceed 5 years, to account for changes in the electrical system that could affect the arc flash risk assessment in accordance with Section 130.5(2).
EBMUD follows the equipment labeling requirements in accordance with NFPA 70E-2015 edition, Section 130.5 (D).
E. Challenges Along the Way
Utility Company -The system data provided by the power utility company for short circuit calculation and incident energy analysis is a challenge for EBMUD. The utility company has a generic disclaimer stating that their electric systems are dynamic, and due to its many variables, a range of impedances are recommended for an arc flash risk assessment.
For example, the utility company recommends using the following system impedance; maximum: 500 MVA; minimum 4.5 MVA; and maximum X/R ratio: 40. However, the present available fault currents and system impedances are also provided. EBMUD uses the present available fault currents and system impedances and updates the results every 5 years since the power to EBMUD facilities is relatively stable.
The utility company also provides a range of transformer impedance values similar to what is shown in Table 2 . The design or tested impedance of the transformer is recorded on the transformer nameplate. To get the exact impedance would require EBMUD to pay the utility company to shut down the transformer, which may impact neighboring customers. Shutdown coordination with the utility company is also challenging if the troubleman is not available to be on site at the appointed time. The troubleman may have other priorities responding to emergencies restoring power to the public. EBMUD worked around this by purchasing a high-power scope to view the transformer impedance and primary protection device nameplate from the ground level, provided the viewing angle is good and the description on the nameplate is not faded. Program Software -Power systems analysis software uses steady-state circuit analysis techniques to solve load flow, short circuit, device evaluation, and arc flash risk assessment simulations. It has limited capability to deal accurately with phenomena involving transient behavior, such as decaying components of short circuit currents produced by motors or asymmetry involving DC exponential decay present in AC faults. When considering the impact of rotating AC motor loads (synchronous and induction machines) on the arc flash risk assessment, the software provides an option to reduce the motor short circuit contribution after a user-selectable time delay. When using this option, the software will accumulate incident energy at a constant rate until the time delay has expired. In reality, there is no step change in an arc energy accumulation, and arc energy accumulation will follow the same exponential decay as the transient short-circuit current, integrated over the transient decay time. In spite of the inaccuracy of this approach, it produces conservative results, and we used this option in the arc flash risk assessment with all synchronous motor short-circuit contributions set to zero after 8 cycles (133 ms).
Breaker Replacement in the MCC -When replacing breakers with functionality features that could lower incident energy level, it often poses a challenge for EBMUD. Especially with the older MCCs, replacing breakers require bucket doors to be retrofitted because of physical dimensional constraints.
Budget -Budget appropriation for the progr challenge for EBMUD. As the scope of work in recommended mitigations are developed into a budget category. To sustain the program and t current codes and standards, the program and managers have to collaborate with different de EBMUD to prioritize the facilities that require im flash risk assessment revisions. Ta  NFPA 70E . EBMUD has been working on more than ten years now and will also be star arc flash risk assessment evaluations to k periodic 5-year review period. 
F. Status of the Program
I. Lessons Learned
Utility owned distribution transfor distribution class fuses protection h levels. This occurs most frequently on transformer when the primary distri sense the current during a secondary A lower short-circuit current can energy levels because some types longer time to trip for lower current.
Large DC Battery systems have h EBMUD uses IEC Standard 61660-1 circuit current and NFPA 70E, Anne current and incident energy. IEEE 1 flash hazards in DC systems wh guidelines for making DC inciden calculations in Annex D of the 201 However, the guidelines included sim based on papers presented at the 20 Workshop and the 2009 IEEE P Industry Conference (PCIC).
High-and medium-voltage elect extensive protective relaying resultin fault and will yield low incident energy cesses (Water) ses (Wastewater) rmers rated with primary have high incident energy n the secondary side of the bution class fuse will not y fault. n lead to higher incident of protective devices take igh incident energy levels. [6] V.
CONCLUSIONS
EBMUD engineers in the Water Department and Wastewater Department are managed and organized independently. However, both groups adhere to the same requirements including the Required Safety Practice (RSP) 1800, NFPA 70E, and IEEE 1584 to assess and evaluate arc flash hazards in the workplace. EBMUD continues to improve the electrical safety program to provide a safe workplace for the workers. Since both groups adhere to the same EBMUD guidelines and requirements, the Wastewater Department shares similar issues that include cost, schedule, and challenges to implement arc flash mitigation.
VI.
